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The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 establishes a separate criminal justice system for child offenders, which is mainly 
aimed at diverting child offenders from the formal criminal justice system. However, when diversion is not feasible, 
convicted child offenders have to be sentenced in child justice courts. This has to be done “in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act” (s 68). Sentence should be preceded by a pre-sentence report, subject to a few exceptions, 
which are briefly explained in this contribution. The main part of the article considers the basic principles of 
sentencing in terms of the Act, with specific emphasis on those principles which guide the discretion to impose 
imprisonment or an alternative sentence. Of particular importance in this respect is that imprisonment should only 
be imposed as last resort, and it inevitable, then for the shortest appropriate period. In contrast to adult offenders, 
the main aim in case of child offenders is to facilitate their reintegration into society, and to ensure that they accept 
responsibility through restorative justice programmes. The seriousness of the crime remains very important, but 
for the first time in our law it is related to the harm caused by the crime, and the offender’s blameworthiness for 
that harm. All these considerations are noted, and some of the implications discussed in more detail in this article. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (hereafter 
referred to as “the Act”) establishes a separate 
criminal justice system for child offenders. Its 
main aim is to keep children out of the formal 
criminal justice system, mainly through 
diversion. Only when diversion is not a feasible 
option should child offenders be tried and 
sentenced in child justice courts. When it comes 
to sentencing, the core provision is section 68, 
which reads that, “A child justice court must, 
after convicting a child, impose a sentence in 
accordance with this Chapter.” It is the focus of 
this paper to assess what is meant by the words 
“impose a sentence in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act”. 
I start by briefly explaining the new 
requirements for pre-sentence reports, but the 
bulk of the paper deals with the imposition of 
sentence itself.  
PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS 
In terms of section 71 of the Act, a child justice 
court must now get a pre-sentence report, 
prepared by a probation officer, before it can 
sentence a child offender.1 Although the Act 
leaves some room for exceptions, this room is 
very limited. In practical terms it is only when 
the offender is to be sentenced for the pettiest of 
offences (when diversion would normally be the 
preferred process), or when the offender has the 
money to pay an appropriate fine immediately.2 
Why the report should always be requested from 
a probation officer is not clear, but the Act does 
appear to leave virtually no exceptions in this 
regard. This does not mean that other experts 
may not also provide pre-sentence reports. Other 
experts could include criminologists, psychiatrists 
and so on. However, their reports will have to be 
provided as additional reports. 
Other requirements of the Act in connection 
with pre-sentence reports largely serve to 
confirm the existing law. 
THE SENTENCES A CHILD JUSTICE 
COURT MAY IMPOSE 
Before the discussion that follows, it is important 
to keep in mind what the sentences are which are 
provided for by the Child Justice Act. The 
available sentences are: 
• Community-based sentences.3 
• Restorative justice sentence.4 
• Fines.5 
• Correctional supervision.6 
• Compulsory residence in a child and youth 
care centre.7 
• Imprisonment.8 
Incidentally, I am of the view that only these 
sentences may be imposed by the court, and that 
any other sentences provided for in, for example, 
the Criminal Procedure Act, are no longer 
available to a child justice court.9 
 
 
 
*  This contribution is a slightly reworked version of a paper read on 19 September 2013 at the Crimsa Biennial conference in Pretoria. 
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GUIDELINES ON IMPOSITION OF 
IMPRISONMENT 
Basic rules regarding imprisonment 
One of the crucial decisions which need to be 
made by any sentencing court is whether to 
impose a custodial sentence or not. It is no 
different in the case of child offenders. As a 
result, I will approach this discussion from the 
basis of imprisonment, although other reasons, 
which are made clear in the process of the paper, 
also dictate such an approach. 
Section 77 directly addresses the imposition of 
imprisonment by a child justice court. First, it 
disallows the imposition of imprisonment on any 
person (child) who is under 14 years old at  
the time.10 Sentences for other child offenders 
may not exceed 25 years’ imprisonment.11 The 
assumption is that this limit applies per offence 
or charge, and not to the totality of offences 
charged, but I will return to this issue later. A 
final rule in section 77 is that the court “must 
antedate the term of imprisonment by the 
number of days that the child has spent in prison 
or child and youth care centre prior to the 
sentence being imposed”.12 This is different 
from the situation in the case of adult offenders, 
where courts are generally expected to take into 
account the pre-sentence detention of the offender, 
but there is no direct requirement that an equal 
period should be subtracted from the sentence.13 
Then follows a fairly complicated set of rules, 
linked to the seriousness of the crime, governing 
which child offenders may be sentenced to 
imprisonment. The rules consist of a 
combination of the crime, the presence or 
absence of previous convictions, and the existence 
or otherwise of “substantial and compelling 
reasons”.14 I will return to these provisions after 
a discussion of the seriousness of the crime. 
To wrap up the discussion of section 77, it is 
necessary to tie down a few loose strands. 
Minimum sentences legislation 
Subsection (2) contains a provision to the effect 
that the minimum sentences legislation should be 
applied in the sentencing of child offenders, 
notwithstanding any other provisions, if the 
offender was 16 or 17 years old at the time of  
the offence. However, the relevant provisions  
of the minimum sentences legislation were 
declared unconstitutional in Centre for Child 
Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development,15 with the result that there are no 
provisions affecting children of 16 and 17. 
Subsection (2) is due for removal, but until then 
a less than careful magistrate might still apply it 
by mistake. 
25 Years’ imprisonment per charge 
I noted earlier that it is assumed that the limit of 
25 years’ imprisonment is per charge. To explain 
it is necessary to quote subsection (4):  
 “A child referred to in subsection (3) may be 
sentenced to a sentence of imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 25 years.” 
Who is this child referred to in subsection (3)? It 
is,16 
 “A child who is 14 years or older at the time of being 
sentenced for the offence, … [who] may only be 
sentenced to imprisonment, if the child is convicted 
of an offence…”. 
The reference to offence is in the singular each 
time. Similar provisions in the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 32 of 1944 have consistently been 
interpreted to refer to one offence: limits in the 
courts’ jurisdiction are per charge or offence.17 
As a result, when an offender has been charged 
with, for example, 20 counts of fraud, a 
magistrate’s court’s jurisdiction is 3 years’ 
imprisonment on each of the 20 counts and 
theoretically, therefore, 60 years’ imprisonment. 
It should be noted that this total jurisdiction, 
which appears on the face of it to be massive, 
has very little bearing on the question what an 
appropriate sentence would be. With multiple 
offences there are other principles in play as 
well, of which the most important is that the 
court must take into account the cumulative 
effect of such sentence. In other words, the court 
should sort of think away the technicality of the 
various charges, and consider the totality of the 
criminal behaviour, and impose a sentence 
reflecting the seriousness of this totality.18 
Similar considerations should apply in the case 
of child offenders. 
Guidelines for the discretion to impose 
imprisonment 
Apart from the rules discussed so far, principles 
aimed at guiding the court in its decision to 
impose imprisonment are scattered throughout 
the Act. Section 77 confirms that child offenders 
should be sentenced to imprisonment only “as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time”.19 This guideline is, 
of course, also contained in the Constitution, 20 
which means that one could refer to it as “the 
constitutional demand”. Most of the other 
guidelines are aimed at giving effect to this 
constitutional demand and it is, therefore, useful 
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to consider those guidelines first, before 
returning to the constitutional demand.  
Further guidelines 
The basic principles of sentencing of child 
offenders are contained in section 69(1) of  
the Act. In addition to again stressing that 
imprisonment should be a last resort,21 this 
provision can be summarised as follows: 
• The sentence must be individualised, and the 
well-known triad of factors, namely the 
offender, the crime and the interests of 
society has to be balanced with one another.  
• Restorative justice should be an important 
consideration of sentencing of children, in 
that this is the approach which would 
“encourage the child to understand the 
implications of and be accountable for the 
harm caused”.22 
• Child offenders should be reintegrated within 
their families and society, if necessary with 
the employment of supervision, treatment or 
whatever other measure might be appropriate. 
There is no reference in section 69 to the other 
purposes of punishment, such as deterrence and 
rehabilitation. Although rehabilitation might be 
assumed under the term reintegration, there is 
nothing to equate with deterrence. A strong 
argument can be made out that this was not an 
oversight by the legislature, and that deterrence 
should also not be incorporated into this 
provision by way of the introductory part of 
section 69(1), which appears to permit the court 
to take into account “any other considerations 
relating to sentencing”. Child offenders should 
not be used to serve as examples to other would-
be offenders, while an appropriate sentence based 
on the considerations noted earlier has the best 
chance of ensuring that the criminal behaviour 
will not be repeated. This argument is also in line 
with various provisions of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, provisions which the 
courts are expected to keep in mind when 
interpreting all the provisions of the Act.23 It is 
further supported by the decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court that the equivalent 
provision in that country’s Act was deliberate 
and that deterrence is not a valid principle or 
purpose in the sentencing of children.24  
In addition to the general guidelines in 
subsection (1), section 69(4) provides further 
guidelines specifically with respect to the 
imposition of imprisonment. It reads as follows: 
 “(4) When considering the imposition of a sentence 
involving imprisonment in terms of section 77, the 
child justice court must take the following factors into 
account:  
(a)  The seriousness of the offence, with due 
regard to—  
(i)  the amount of harm done or risked through 
the offence; and  
(ii) the culpability of the child in causing or 
risking the harm;  
(b)  the protection of the community;  
(c)  the severity of the impact of the offence on the 
victim;  
(d)  the previous failure of the child to respond to 
non-residential alternatives, if applicable; and  
(e)  the desirability of keeping the child out of 
prison.” 
Three of these factors would tend to aggravate 
the sentence in case of a serious crime, namely 
(1) the need of society to be protected again an 
offender who is violent or difficult to control, 
such as (2) when “non-residential alternatives” 
have proven to be ineffective, and (3) when the 
impact of the crime on the victim is severe 
(especially when this cannot be redressed 
through some form of restorative justice 
process).  
The main guideline of this provision, which has 
potential to impact sentencing beyond the limits 
of child justice, relates to the seriousness of the 
crime. 
The seriousness of the crime 
Section 69(4) explicitly requires the court to take 
account of the seriousness of the offence, but 
then it continues that this seriousness has to be 
accounted for with “due regard to … the amount 
of harm done or risked through the offence; and 
… the culpability of the child in causing or 
risking the harm” (emphasis added). This is the 
first time I know of that any legislation in South 
Africa has referred to harm and culpability as 
indicators of the seriousness of a committed 
crime.  
Internationally, most of the criminal justice 
systems worth comparing already use these two 
elements as determinants of the seriousness of 
the crime. These systems include the United 
States, Canada, English law, all the Australian 
and most European jurisdictions.25 These 
elements have also been proposed by the South 
African Law Commission in its Report of 2000 
as the factors which determine the seriousness of 
a crime.26 In short, the DNA of these elements is 
well-established. But in practice, in our criminal 
justice system, they are unknown. This does not 
mean that courts do not regularly take note of the 
harm done by crimes in assessing the seriousness 
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of the crime, or that courts do not consider the 
culpability of offenders when determining which 
sentence is appropriate.  But the courts have not 
before been required to actually make an 
assessment of the harm involved with an 
offence, and generally the culpability of the 
offender has not been part of an assessment of 
the seriousness of the crime. It would have been 
possible to speak about these two components of 
the seriousness of the crime and the research 
done on them for the whole day. Instead, I am 
going to make the following observations only, 
and leave it there: 
1 The seriousness of the crime has just about 
always been an important factor in 
determining an appropriate sentence. So far 
the courts have always made a rough 
discretionary assessment of this seriousness, 
without making a separate (interim) finding 
about the sentence which would fit the crime 
only. It is likely that many sentencers will 
simply continue this approach, and will not 
make a particularly accurate finding about 
the harm or the culpability. However, section 
69(4) is mandatory, in that it states that the 
court “must” take account of these factors27 
and in terms of the general principles of our 
law, when a court must take certain factors 
into account, it must specifically address 
them in its judgment.28 
2 Harm should generally be understood in 
accordance with its normal meaning, and so 
let me quote a dictionary on this meaning: 
“physical injury, especially that which is 
deliberately inflicted; material damage; 
actual or potential ill effect.”29 
3 Culpability has a technical meaning within 
South African criminal law, to the effect that 
people can only be held accountable if they 
have a “guilty mind” (mens rea) with respect 
to their criminal act. To quote one source in 
this respect: “The whole question of 
culpability may be reduced to one simple 
question, namely ‘could one in all fairness 
have expected X to avoid this wrongdoing?’”30 
Culpability and blameworthiness are 
virtually the same,31 and the issue here is 
that when, for some reason, an offender is 
less than fully to blame for the harm 
associated with the crime, then the 
seriousness of the crime is reduced. To give 
full effect to this factor presupposes that the 
court should make some assessment of how 
much the offender is to blame, if this is less 
than fully, and this might even extend to a 
specific figure, such as that the offender is 
only 50% culpable (or blameworthy). Child 
offenders are less culpable than adult 
offenders for the same kinds of actions 
because of all the reasons why children are 
considered different: they are “less mature, 
more vulnerable to influence and pressure 
from others, … more open to rehabilitation.” 
To summarise this discussion: we now have a 
requirement that the seriousness of the crime 
should be determined by two internationally 
recognised factors. This requirement appears, on 
the face of it, to be very limited. It only appears 
in section 69(4), in connection with the 
imposition of imprisonment, and only sets a 
requirement which a child justice court needs to 
apply. In other words, there is no demand from 
courts trying adult offenders, and the requirement 
does not apply when a court is only considering 
a sentence other than imprisonment. However, 
and this is my tentative argument, these two 
factors will eventually have to find much wider 
application. First, it makes no sense for a child 
justice court to determine the seriousness of the 
crime according to one standard for one kind of 
sentence, but according to another standard for 
another kind of sentence. In the same vein, it 
makes no sense for child justice courts to 
determine the seriousness of the crime for child 
offenders in accordance with one standard, 
different from the standard the other courts 
utilise for adult offenders.   
The seriousness of the crime in terms of 
the schedules to the Act 
As noted earlier, the Act contains lists of the 
crimes of which a child offender might be 
convicted in three schedules to the Act, with the 
least serious offences in Schedule 1 and the most 
serious in Schedule 3. In my view all the 
offences are contained in these schedules, but 
there is a reservation that there might be an 
obscure crime here and there that slipped 
through the cracks somehow, but the wording of 
the schedules certainly attempts to be all-
encompassing.32  
A few examples of the crimes in the schedules 
give a sense of what is involved here. Schedule 3 
includes crimes such as treason, murder, rape, 
aggravated robbery, and so on. Statutory 
offences include other serious sexual offences, 
drug offences, firearm offences and then also a 
number of generalised items, including serious 
offences committed by a gang or in an organised 
manner,33 and “Any other statutory offence 
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where the maximum penalty determined by that 
statute is imprisonment for a period exceeding 
ﬁve years…”34 
In Schedule 1, containing the least serious 
crimes, some of the most serious instances 
include theft involving property of an amount 
not exceeding R2 500; fraud not exceeding an 
amount of more than R1 500; unlawful possession 
of certain drugs; consensual "statutory rape"; 
common assault, etc. But there are also 
generalised items, such as “Any other statutory 
offence where the maximum penalty determined 
by that statute is imprisonment for a period of no 
longer than three months…”35  Very few statutory 
offences have such short maximum periods. 
Schedule-2 offences cover the middle ground.  
The rules in the Act, linked to these offences, 
are the following: The simplest principle relates 
to the most serious offences, where the Act 
permits imprisonment without any further 
requirements.36 Imprisonment may be imposed 
for schedule-2 offences only when there are 
“substantial and compelling reasons” for the 
imposition of imprisonment. These “substantial 
and compelling reasons” are also required before 
imprisonment may be imposed for the least 
serious (schedule-1) offences, when in addition 
imprisonment is only permitted if the offender 
has “relevant previous convictions”. 
It is notable that no judgment has yet been 
reported in which the words “substantial and 
compelling reasons” have been attended to. The 
phrase “substantial and compelling”, which 
describe the circumstances which have to exist 
before a court may depart from the minimum 
sentences prescribed for serious crimes in the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, are 
well-known. In that context our courts have 
preferred not to circumscribe these words to any 
greater extent, and have decided that they mean 
that there must be really good reasons for 
departing from the prescribed sentences, that the 
prescribed sentences should normally be imposed, 
but that a court should never permit an injustice 
to be done through a sentence it imposes.37 From 
this one might argue that “substantial and 
compelling reasons” in the Child Justice Act 
should at least mean that a court should impose 
imprisonment for the less serious range of crimes 
only when there are really good reasons to do so, 
but that the normal approach should be that 
imprisonment should not be imposed. On the 
other hand, there is also a strong argument to be 
made out that the wording in the minimum 
sentences legislation is so different from the 
Child Justice Act, and that the purpose of the 
phrases are actually diametrically opposed, so 
that the interpretation in the minimum sentences 
legislation is of no use to the interpretation of the 
Child Justice Act. But even if one concedes these 
arguments, judgments on “substantial and 
compelling circumstances” have considered the 
ordinary meaning of these words, and are 
therefore still relevant. For example, S v Riekert38 
noted that “substantial and compelling” cannot 
be equated to “unique” or “highly exceptional” 
nor merely “convincing” or “relevant”, but that it 
should go to the core of the matter; “compelling” 
means that the circumstances are almost impossible 
to ignore. In S v Homareda39 the court held that 
substantial means “weighty, as opposed to 
trifling or insignificant”, and “compelling” 
involves being “urged irresistibly, constrained or 
obliged”. All these words confirm that the final 
decision will be in the hands (discretion, if you 
will) of the sentencer, and this point returns this 
discussion to the issue of imprisonment as last 
resort, the constitutional demand. 
When would imprisonment be a last 
resort? 
The fact is that this decision is inescapably a 
discretionary decision, which has to be left to the 
sentencer. At the same time, whether imprison-
ment is a last resort should not depend 
exclusively on the view of the individual 
presiding officer. As should be clear by now, the 
Act does regulate and guide this discretion. 
These guidelines could be summarised with a list 
of factors which the child justice court has to 
address in its sentencing judgment, and has to do 
explicitly: 
• The harm caused or risked by the offence. 
• The culpability or blameworthiness of the 
offender. 
• The impact of the offence on the victim. 
• Whether the child offender is so dangerous 
that society needs to be protected against him. 
• In the case of a schedule-2 offence, whether 
there are substantial and compelling reasons 
for the imposition of imprisonment, together 
with an exposition of these reasons. 
• In the case of a schedule-3 offence, the 
relevant previous convictions.  
• The importance of imposing a sentence that 
will assist the child’s reintegration into 
society. 
• The importance of imposing a sentence 
which will restore the harm, or other 
imbalances caused by the offence. 
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• Imprisonment may only be imposed when it 
is inescapable, and in coming to this 
conclusion, if the court is to err, it must err on 
the side of a non-custodial sentence. 
Children who act as “adults”  
From time to time one comes across the 
argument that a young offender cannot be treated 
as a child, as his actions were not commensurate 
with what one would expect of a child. Such an 
approach should have come to an end with the 
judgment in S v Machasa.40 Two of the appellants 
were 17 and 16 years old respectively when the 
deceased was murdered by a group of people in 
the course of public unrest. They were part of a 
bigger group. The trial judge held the brutality of 
their actions against them, finding that they acted 
with inherent wickedness. Appellate Judge Van 
Heerden found that it is not useful to import the 
concept of inherent wickedness in establishing 
the blameworthiness of these offenders, as their 
actions are explained by their immaturity, their 
lack of judgement and self-control, and that they 
are more easily influenced by other people.41 
This approach is also reflected in the judgment 
by the Constitutional Court in Centre for Child 
Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development:42   
 “The sharp distinction between children and adult 
offenders is not out of sentimental considerations, 
but for practical reasons relating to children’s greater 
physical and psychological vulnerability. [Children 
are] … more needful of protection, less resourceful 
… less mature, more vulnerable to influence and 
pressure from others … more capable of 
rehabilitation …”. 
It is a feather in the cap of the South African 
legislature that it did not follow the many 
examples in the so-called free world, which 
allows children to be tried as adults when they 
commit more serious crimes. 
CHILD OFFENDER 
I have spoken of a “child offender” throughout 
this paper.43 It is important to understand that the 
Child Justice Act can only find application if the 
offender was a child, that is, under the age of 18 
years old, when he or she committed the offence. 
We all know that South African wheels of justice 
can at times turn very slowly. How does this 
problem affect the sentencing of child offenders? 
There is a variety of different scenarios. 
The simplest scenario would present itself 
when the offender is still under 18 years old at 
the time of sentencing. In this case the provisions 
of the Act and their consequences for child 
offenders find full application.  
In a second scenario the offender can be under 
18 years of age at the time when the proceedings 
are instituted, but no longer a child at the time of 
sentencing. Such an offender will still have to be 
dealt with in terms of the Child Justice Act. 
However, it could now be argued that not all the 
provisions can be applied in equal measure. For 
example, it is a child who should not be 
imprisoned except as a last resort. If the offender 
before the court is already 18 years or older, so 
the argument could go, this principle no longer 
applies in terms of the Constitution. While this is 
true, the Act defines “child”,44 and whenever it 
uses this word, it has to be interpreted in terms of 
this definition. And the Act’s definition will 
cover the offender in this scenario, even if the 
proceedings are drawn out to such an extent that  
the offender is much older at the time of 
sentencing.45 It will be for the court to deal with 
any practical problems which might arise 
because the offender might be now be an adult, 
with his own family, employment, and so on. 
A third scenario would relate to someone who 
committed the crime while being under 18 years 
old, but the proceedings are only instituted at a 
later stage, when the offender is already an adult. 
Generally, these cases will be dealt with in the 
ordinary courts, and the Child Justice Act will 
find no application. However, when it comes to 
the severity of sentence, the court should 
mitigate the sentence because of the offender’s 
youth. I would argue that there is no reason why 
the court should not apply the same approach as 
I discussed earlier today, because that offender 
was still someone “less mature, more vulnerable 
to influence and pressure from others”. 
CLOSING 
When Parliament introduced the Child Justice 
Act, it was quite a momentous occasion. 
Through this step South Africa is now one of the 
leading countries in its compliance with its 
obligations in terms of the Convention on the 
Rights of a Child. To make sense of all the 
provisions of the Act, and to keep all the 
connections and links in mind at the right time, is 
no easy task. In a way I hope you are totally 
confused about many of the details of the 
legislation, because that is the way it should be 
unless one has the Act and related documents on 
your lap. However, the effort is worth it, because 
we are dealing with our future, the children of 
South Africa.  
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